Abstract-Rules Tor assessing compliance with percentile standards commonly limit the number of exceedances permitted in a batch or samples taken over a defined assessment period. Such rules are commonly developed using classical statistical methods. Results from alternative Bayesian methods-are presented (using beta-distributed prior information and a binomial likelihood), resulting in "confidence of compliance" graphs. These allow simple reading or the wnsumer's risk and (he supplier's risks Tor any proposed rule. The influence or the prior assumptions required by the Bayesian technique an the confidence results is demonstrated, using two rererenee priors (unifom and Jeflreys') and also using optimistic and pessimistic user-defined priors. All four give less pessimistic results than does the classical technique, because interpreting classical results as "confidence 01compliance" actually invokes a Bayesian approach with an extreme prior distribution. Jefieys' prior is shown to be the most generally appropriate choice of prior distribution. Cost savings can be expected using rules based on this approach.
INTRODUCTION

two-parameter beta distribution
Percentile standards are increasingly used in environconfidence of compliance mental management, e.g., for drinking-water supplies wnfidence or railure number of exceedances or a percentile limit (MoH, 1995) , waste discharge permits (Ellis, 1989 ) number or permissible exceedances under a and toxicity standards (ANZECC & ARMCANZ, benefit-or-doubt stance 1999). Rules for compliance with these standar&.;rre number or permissible exceedances under a rail-generally derived from classical one-sided hypbthesis safe stance posterior distribution function tests in which the p-value is used as a weight-ofprior probability density Function evidence measure against the tested hypothesis; ,In posterior probability density runction developing and in applying such ruleswe need to incomplele beta runction ratio consider both risks of reaching false wnclusions: the likelihood runction number of samples supplier's risk (falsely inferring a breach of standard) p-value or a one-sided hypothesis test and the consumer's risk (falsely inferring complivariance or sample exceedance rate ance). The former risk is faced by the water supplier probability or exceedance or a single random or by the waste discharger; the latter is faced by the sample water drinker or by the receiving environment. samole mean exceedance rate cnti'cal exceedance probability (X = 0.05 Tor a 95
T h e tested hypothesis usually posits compliance, in percentile standard) which case the supplier's risk is kept small-because this is the Type I error risk and the testing procedure Greeli sy,y,nbols always restricts this to he below a small value, a significance level typically significance level a = 5%. Accordingly, .the consumer's risk is rather large in cases, where the standard actually is in breach (it would be 95% for marginal non-compliance). However, though much less common, the tested hypothesis may be chosen to 'Author lo whom all correspondence should be addressed. posit breach (non-compliance), in which case the Tel.: + 64-7-856-1726; Pax: + 64-7-856-0151; e-mail: Type I error risk is now the consumer's risk and so g.mcbride@niwa.cri.nz this is the risk that is kept small. The Type I1 error risk is then the supplier's risk and it can be large for marginal compliance.
While this procedure is objective (inasmuch as choosing a value of a is so) it has a number of inherent problems. First, the assessor is often not aware of the possibility of reversing the role of the two error risks, by choosing to test either the hypothesis of compliance or the hypothesis of breach. Second, there is debate in statistical literature (e.g., Goodman, 1993; Harlow el al., 1997; Royall, 1997) as to the role ofp-values as weights-of-evidence (the debate is strongest for two-sided tests of point hypotheses). Third, and most importantly, the procedure does not'appear to provide direct statements about the probability of compliance, as it considers instead the probability of gaining ranges of data (e.g., more exceedances than were actually obtained) if the tested hypothesis (e.g., compliance) were true. A compliance assessor or a Court may find this somewhat tangential to the central issue, i.e., balancing the probability of breach vs. the probability of compliance.
Compliance assessment based on a Bayesian approach has the potential to address such issues directly, without the need to consider significance levels, Type I error risk and Type I1 error riskindeed these are irrelevant in a Bayesian framework (Lee, 1989) . We argue herein that they can give simpler and more direct information to a compliance assessor or to a Court, even though they do call for a subjective element of infomation-the assessor's belief as to the probability of compliance before data come to hand. This belief is represented as a "prior" distribution. If a "reference prior" is specified, reflecting the assessor's lack of prior knowledge, one obtains a simple statement of "confidence of compliance". Using the most appropriate (JelTreys') prior gives less stringent compliance rules than those based on classical methods. If an informative prior is used-reflecting the assessor's prior belief as to likely exceedance rates-there can be considerable discrepancies between Bayesian and classical results, particularly for small numbers of samples.
COMPLIANCE WITH PERCENTILE STANDARDS-CLASSICAL APPROACH
Percentile standards require that a certain limit (e.g., of a chemical's concentration) should not be exceeded for more than a percentage of an assessment period. This requirement is properly stated as a percentage of lime in which the limit may be exceeded (which is always unknown), not as a percentage of santplcs in which that limit may be exceeded (which is only known once data are reported- Ellis and Lacey, 1980) . A compliance rule derived from such a standard generally requires that no more than a stated number of exceedances of the percentile limit should occur in a given number of samples over a compliance assessment period. In formulating this rule we do not know whether sampling error will cause future assessments to he in error in their inferences as to compliance or breach, nor is it known which error--supplier's or consumer's-might occur. Accordingly the rule should be based on a consideration of both error risks (Ellis, 1989) . In doing so one must note that once the number of samples has been decided only one of these risks can be controlled (i.e., kept small). If compliance is in fact marginal, the other risk will be large. Furthermore, the risk to be controlled is determined by the assessor's choice of the hypothesis to be tested. If that hypothesis posits compliance (as is usual) it is the supplier's risk that will be kept small. But in a precautionary approach one could invert the tested hypothesis so that it posits that the standard has been breached. In that case it is the consumer's risk that will be controlled. These have been characterised by Ellis (1989) as the be~~efit of -doubt and fail-safe approaches.
The error risks can be quantified using classical one-sided hypothesis tests. The key calculation therein is the probability of obtaining data at least as extreme as was obtained iftbe tested hypothesis is (only just) true, i.e., compliance is "borderline". This is the "p-value". If this is less than the a priori significance level (usually taken as u = 5%), one has a "statistically significant" result and infers that there has been breach or compliance (depending on which hypothesis has been tested). That is, the p-value is used as a weight-of-evidence against the tested hypothesis. If that hypothesis posits compliance, then p is the supplier's risk; if the hypothesis posits hreach, then p is the consumer's risk. Because the tested hypothesis posits borderline compliance, these .risks are maximum values.
For example, consider a permit requiring (inter alia) that the total inorganic nitrogen concentration ("TIN) in the effluent from a coastal sewage treatment plant should be below 10gm-"or at least 98% of a three-month summer period, based on two samplings every outgoing tide. Compliance with this 98 percentile standard is therefore to be assessed using about n = 350 samples. Denote by c the number of exceedances of the l~g m -~ limit in these samples. If the supplier's risk is chosen to be the one that is controlled then, as above, the tested hypothesis must posit compliance, i.e., x < 0.02, where x is the probability of exceedance for any single random sample. We can then use the following formula to identify the maximum permissible number of exceedances under this benefit-of-doubt approach (ebd) while still reaching a verdict of "compliance":
where A' is the value o f x where the tested hypothesis is only just true (i.e., X = 0.02 in this example) and a is the maximum acceptable supplier's risk. The lehhand-side of equation (I) gives the probability of ohtainingmore than exceedances when in fact the
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Confidence of compliance lor percentiles effluent was just complying (i.e., x = X = 0.02)-ebd is to be selected as its lowest value satisfying p 5 u (p = a will seldom be attained because exceedance data are discrete, not continuous). Because the tested hypothesis is compliance and we are demanding a high standard of proof before it will be rejected (e.g., only a 5% significance level), the proportion of allowable exceedances (i.e., %din) will al~uuys exceed X. The required probability can be calculated by noting that for random sampling e is distributed as cumulative binomial (regardless of the distribution of the underlying process), i.e., where "C, is the binomial coefficient. Taking n = 350, X = 0.02 and a = 5% we can use available numerical algorithms (e.g., Press el a/., 1986) to obtain p = 5.15% for ebd = l l and p = 2.57% for ebd = 12. Accordingly, from equation (I), we must allow up to ebd = 12 exceedances of the 1 0 g m -~ limit in those 350 samples (i2e., about 3.4% of the samples).
However, if the consumer's risk is to be controlled (in a precautionary fail-safe approach), the tested hypothesis must now posit breach, i.e., x 2 0.02. Because we are demanding a high standard of proof before this hypothesis will be rejected, the proportion of allowable exceedances (i.e., coin) will never exceed X. The appropriate formula is where er, is its highest value satisfying p 5 u. Note that testing this fail-safe approach means that a is now the maximum acceptable consumer's risk. Taking n = 350, X = 0.02 and a = 5%, we obtain p = 2.85% and p = 7.97% for er, = 2 and 3 respectively. Accordingly we can allow up to only er, = 2 exceedances of the l~g m -~ limit in those samples (i.e., about 0.6% of the samples).
COMPLIANCE WITH PPRCEhTlLE STANDARDS-BAYESIAN AI'PROACH
In a Bayesian analysis we no longer assume one particular exceedance probability value (i.e., x = A' ) in computing probabilities; it is regarded as a continuous variable about which we want to make confidence statements. In doing so we use the actual data obtained (and not any data more extreme than that obtained) to update a prior belief to obtain a posrerior. belief, which we call "confidence of compliance". This uses Bayes' theorem. The prior belief or knowledge is stated as a probability density function (pdf) over the range of its possible values, and is to be decided before data come to hand (similarly, the significance level for a classical test should be stated before data are collected). Accordingly the posterior information gained is also a pdf. We can then get the required probabilities by integrating that function up to X.
The equation for the posterior pdf, from Bayes' theorem (Press, 1989) , takes the form where e is the number of exceedances in n samples; h(x(e, n) is the posterior pdf of x for a given value of e and n; L(eln, x) is the "likelihood function'' for any n and x; and g(x) is the prior pdf of x (independent of ?r and e). This equation shows that the apriori belief about the true exceedance rate x, measured by g(x), is updated by the "standardised likelihood" (the term in brackets) to derive the required posterior probability density h.
For a set of 17 samples the likelihood function is the probability mass function for a particular value of c, with x (rather than e) being regarded as the function's parameter. It is the term being summed in equations (2) and (3), for any value of x (not just for X as in those equations), i.e., L(e(x,n)=' C,xG(l-x)"-' (5) (the sum of L over all possible values of e is unity, but the integral of L over all x i s not-hence it is called a likelihood rather than a density). Therefore, noting that the binomial coefficients cancel in the standardised likelihood function, the posterior probability density is given by and the probability of compliance (i.e., "confidence of compliance", denoted as CC) is calculated from the distribution function
We also define the "confidence of failure" as CF= I -CC.
Choosing a prior distribulion
The choice of the prior density g(x) may be approached in two general ways. In either case it is highly desirable to use a "conjugate distribution". This guarantees that the prior and posterior probability densities belong to the same family of distributions, making the calculations required by equations (6) and (7) much simpler. Therefore, noting that the likelihood function follows a binomial distribution, we choose g(x) to follow the versatile beta distribution, Be(([. b) (see the appendix), because these distributions are conjugate to a binomial likelihood, Lee (1989) .
First, we can use a "reference prior", reflecting the views of someone with no particular a priori beliefs, as will be shown in Fig. 1 . Noting that an optimal prior does not exist (Lee, 1989) , perhaps the most obvious selection is the uniform prior, also known as "Bayes' postulate", in which g(x)= l for all possible values of the exceedance rate (i.e., 0 < _ x5 I). It implies that all values of x are equally likely and is a special case of the beta distribution, i.e., Be(], I). However the U-shaped prior derived from "Jeffreys' rule" (Lee, 1 9 8 9 g~e ( & +)--can be argued to be a better choice (it is invariant under any change of scale of measurement). Second, we may feel that, for example, it is very unlikely that x would be too much above zero, and so specify our own (informative) prior. For example. based on past experience, we could take the expected value of the true exceedance rate as 2=0.1 and its variance as s2= 0.01 .(corresponding to meeting a 90 percentile standard). 01we could hold that the true exceedance rate is 2-0.01 with variance 9 = 0.001 (corresponding to meeting a 99 percentile standard). We can then calculate a and b from the known expressions for the mean and variance of the beta distribution (Lee, 1989) , i.e., Z=a/(a+ b) and s2=ab/ [(a+ b)' (a +b+ I)], from which we obtain
We therefore obtain Be(0.8, 7.2) and Be(0.089, 8.81 1) as our prior distributions for these two cases. As we shall be considering 95, 98 and 99 percentiles, these two functions will be denoted as the pessimistic prior and the optimistic prior, respectively.
Calcularing posterior probabilities
Because h is a beta density, it follows that Ffollows an incomplete beta function ratio, written as ix(a, b) (see the appendix). Inserting the beta pdf (see the (6) and (7) we see that aponcrior = aprior+ e and bpos,uio, = bprior+ n-e (Lee, 1989) . Accordingly the posterior distribution function is given by CC = F(x 5 Xle, n) = Ix(apri,, +e, bprior +rt-e) (9) This can be calculated using numerical methods (e.g., Press er aL, 1986 ). Figure 1 shows the shape of the four prior distributions discussed above. ~~~h curve encloses a Unit area. ~i~~~~~2 and 3 show the sensitivity of confidence of comoliance (and confidence of failure) 
Confidence of Conlpliance graphs
DlSCUSSlON
Choice and inpuence of priors
As shown in Fig. 1 , the uniform reference prior affords equal probability to all (equal) increments of x. This is not entirely reasonable, as lower exceedance rates can most often be expected to have a higher probability than do higher rates. Jeffreys' reference prior explicitly allows this to occur. However, because this (and other) reference priors are symmetrical on the unit x interval (Lee, 1989) , it also allows high exceedance rates to be more likely than moderate values. This apparent problem turns out to be minimal, as will be seen. That is, if data indicate only low values of x, the influence of the prior near x = 1 is quickly extinguished. For this reason we choose Jeffreys' as th; reference prior. A further possibility, Haldane's Be(O.0) prior, acts rather similarly but has the unfortunate property that CC= 100% when no exceedances occur (because Ix(0, n) 1).For this reason we do not favour this prior, even though it is recommended by Lee (1989) .
The two informative (pessimistic and optimistic) priors are more reasonable in that they accord highest probabilities to the lowest exceedance rate, and decrease monotonically from there (this is a property of all beta distributions with a < l and h > I). These priors are of course subjective, in that individual assessors may nominate different priors and so reach somewhat different conclusions. that, as expected, the optimistic prior produces the and exceedances. The divergence between the results highest C C values. The uniform prior gives the lowest for these priors is most pronounced a t the highest CC values, lower evCn than the pessimistic prior. S o percentile (99 percentile), which is where the priors while the unifotm prior has some appearance of are most different. F o r a 95 percentile (Fig. 3) the impartiality, in fact it can be argued to produce divergence is quite small, except for zero exceedances overly pessimistic results. The influence o r the priors and n<20 where the optimistic prior gives much is most pronounced a1 smaller numbers or simples higher C C values. Number of samples, n Fig. 6 . Confidence or compliance for a 95 percentile standard, using Jelfreys' prior.
Compliance of confidence graphs can be used when considering sampling requirements for compliance rules seeking to control either the consumer's risk or the supplier's risk. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the results for a 95 percentile, withmaximum risks constrained to be less than 5%. Results for the consumer's risk using the Bayesian approach were obtained by reading 11 values Tor which CC first exceeds 95% (i.e., for which C F first falls below 5%). For Jeffrey's prior and a 95 percentile this may be done using the top dashed line on for the supplier's risk using the Bayesian approach were obtained by reading n values for which C F first exceeds 95% (i.e., for which C C first falls below 5%), using the bottom dashed line on the figure. The classical results were obtained from equations (2) and (3) as then values where the appropriatep-values first fell below 5%. (Software has also been developed to do these calculations for any percentile, risk and prior parameters.) In these tables we see that the uniform prior produces the most onerous sampling requirements of the four Bayesian options, with the classical approach being slightly more so. Note that the classical supplier's risk (equation (2)) may also be written as p = I,x(cbd + I, li-chd) (see appendix), whereas the CC value for the uniform prior (equation Confidence or compliance for percentiles is not possible to keep the supplier's risk below 5% in thsss cmss.
(9), with c = Cbd) is CC =IX(CM + I, I +n-CM).
Therefore, if we had chosen Be(l, 0) as the reference prior the classical and Bayesian results would have been identical. Such correspondences are known to occur for particular choices of priors in one-sided tests (Edwards et al., 1963; Pratt, 1965; DeGroot, 1973; Casella and Berger, 1987; Lee, 1989) . Because Be(l,O) concentrates all prior probability at the most extreme exceedance (its pdf is everywhere zero except at x = I), we see that the classical approach is the most pessimistic of all cases. Table 1 shows that using the Bayesian approach with Jeffreys' prior, the minimum number of complying samples that need to he collected to give 95% confidence of meeting a 95 percentile standard is 38, compared with the classical approach's requirement of 59 samples. However if one transgression of the percentile limits occurs at least 77 samples are needed (compared with 93). Therefore, using this reference prior, substantial reduction in sampling effort can he expected while still meeting the same confidence criteria.
Returning to the example of the coastal sewage TIN discharge 98 percentile standard we note from Fig. 5 (using Jeffreys' prior) that for n = 350 samples the confidence of failure first exceeds 95% whcn n = 12 (in agreement with the classical approach). However, the confidence of compliance first exceeds 95% when 3 exceedances are observed in (vs. 2 in the classical approach). So again, a more reasonable prior assumption (than given by the Be(l, 0) distribution implicit in the classical approach) results in less onerous compliance requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian approaches give direct answers to questions of confidence of compliance with percentile standards, and so enable the supplier's risk and the consumer's risk to be identified. This facility comes at the "cost" of having to state one's prior belief as to likely exceedance rates. However, the comparison between classical and Bayesian results demonstrates the strong similarity in their results if one uses a uniform reference prior distribution, and that the classical approach in fact gives the most pessimistic results. Indeed, in making a confidence statement using that approach one has (perhaps unwittingly) adopted the most pessimistic prior. Using the proposed Bayesian technique (with Jefreys' reference prior) makes compliance rules less onerous, parlicularly for 
